Location Leaks on the GSM Air Interface

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Problem definition

- Large array of towers broadcasting messages
 - Can those messages reveal a phone's location?
- Given a person's phone number
 - can we locate the tower they are attached to in a GSM network?
- GSM: dominant protocol worldwide
 - Analysis of layer 2/3 messages only.
- No collaboration from the service provider.
- No support from apps.



Cellular network architecture



The GSM paging procedure





Measurement platform





GSM paging channel observations

| | T-Mobile LAC 747b | AT&T LAC 7d11 |
|------------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| Paging Requests – IMSI | 27,120 | 8,897 |
| Paging Requests – TMSI | 257,159 | 84,526 |
| Paging Requests Type 1 | 284,279 | 91,539 |
| Paging Requests Type 2 | 1,635 | 26 |
| Paging Requests Type 3 | 0 | 1 |
| Observation period | 24 hours | 24 hours |



Pages and human activity





Phone number-TMSI mapping





No recovered TMSI







Silent paging

- Delay between the call initiation and the paging request
 - 3 seconds



Time/seconds

- Median delay between call initiation and ring
 - 6 seconds



Bounding the LAC

- LACs can be very large.
 - T-Mobile LAC 747d: 100km²
- Used a wall-following algorithm, road permitting.
- Call to MS on NW corner.
- Observed paging request on SE corner.





The GSM paging procedure



Same tower test

• Delay between the paging request and the immediate assignment message.



Time difference between paging and IA messages / seconds

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Finding individual towers

- Find individual towers with a hill-climbing algorithm.
 - Non-uniform RF attenuation.
 - Overshoot by 50m to avoid local maximum.





ARFCN a phone is likely to camp on



Tracking users in motion



Defenses

- Page multiple areas.
 - Less than 0.6% of paging requests are not type 1.
 - Available bandwidth for additional pages.
 - Human trajectories are predictable.
- Continuous time mixes.
 - Switch TMSI at least once per page.
 - phone/TMSI bitwise unlinkable.
 - Prevent traffic analysis.
 - Cover traffic.
 - Add exponential delay to paging requests.



Conclusion

- Systems with broadcast paging protocols could leak location information.
- Leaks observable with
 - readily available equipment equipment,
 - no (direct) help from the service provider.
- Proposed low cost fixes.
- Responsible disclosures.
 - 3GPP, Nokia, AT&T research



Thank you

• Questions

